While awaiting December 9th and the meeting of the European Council that was to decide on whether Serbia merited EU candidate status, a very lively debate regarding Serbia’s European future and the conditions that needed satisfying to make it happen was taking place in the country

The eventual decision, which was to revisit the fulfilment of conditions in February 2012 and have the matter referred  to  the  March  European  Council,  made  the  discussion even more heated.
A number of voices were heard saying a failure in reform processes initiated in the previous 3 years were to be blame. The  Commission’s  opinion  on  Serbia’s  application,  published on October 12th, however, clearly stated that achievements in reforms, even though they are far from completed, were sufficient for a positive recommendation on candidate status  and  even  a  beginning  of  accession  talks.  What  the Commission wanted to see before the 9th December was a resumption of the Belgrade – Prištinadialogue and the implementation  of  previously  concluded  agreements.  For  the beginning of accession talks, significant progress in the normalization  of  relations  between  Belgrade  and  Priština  was expected, including an agreement on inclusive participation in  regional  issues  such  as  telecommunications  and electricity, as well as support for EULEX and KFOR to exercise their mandates in the whole of Kosovo. Those who were blaming the government for the failure of reforms were mostly silent on Kosovo related problems. When there were contributions to the debate, they were predominantly  saying  that  the  government  went  too  far  with both  dialogue  and  normalization,  and  therefore  contrary  to
what the Council concluded and what is expected for a positive decision in March.
Another  group  of  critics  claimed  that  policy,  aimed  at achieving  results  on  the  issues  of  both  Kosovo  and  Europe, failed, and that if a European future is to be pursued Kosovo needs to be dropped. Therefore, a lot depends on how the expected results of the Kosovo policy are defined. If one expects 22 countries, which recognize Kosovo’s statehood, to change their minds and look for a solution to open issues from a neutral  point  of  view,  then  it  is  likely  to  make  progress  towards the EU difficult. If however, the Kosovo policy is to deliver on matters like the rights of Serbian people in Kosovo - individually and as a group, and the protection of property and historical and cultural sites, then it can be pursued simultaneous-
ly with the European integration of Serbia. It does not mean that  Serbia  would  always  have  to  see  eye-to-eye  with  all  of its European partners on the best modalities to achieve this, but  being  engaged  in  continuous  dialogue  and  progress  towards the EU is the best way of succeeding in these difficult circumstances.
Finally,  many  emotions  were  stirred  by  the  interpretation that Serbia was, in fact, expected to implicitly recognize Kosovo. Kosovo’s statehood polarizes EU members, as 22 recognize it and 5 don’t. However, all of them agree that the whole region  needs  to  participate  in  cooperation  and  progress  towards  the  European  Union. All  of  them  also  support  EULEX, which was sent to Kosovo on the basis of a joint decision. This means  Serbia  is  expected  to  engage  in  a  way  that  does  not preclude  the  goals  supported  by  all  27  members  of  the  EU. And that is not the same as implicit recognition. I would have been happier if the decision of the European Council  on  9th  December  had  been  to  grant  candidate  status to Serbia. Such a decision would have been the best form of  support  for  many  of  the  significant  steps  that  have  been made, and the best investment in the continuation of reforms and political processes that made those steps happen. I similarly  thought  the  Djindjić  government  deserved  a  positive Feasibility  Study  and  the  Interim Agreement  implementation should  have  started  earlier.  Nevertheless,  one  must  keep  in mind that the continuation of reforms and political processes, aimed at solving complex problems, is something that Serbia needs  to  do  anyway. A  European  future  was  chosen  precisely because it guaranteed reforms and problem solving would be a priority. This is why more reforms and dialogue need to take place following the 9th December. It will not be easy, but it needs to be done irrespective of the outcome in March. ■